當廠商所生產的商品會對環境產生負擔時，政府可以藉由商品稅的課徵來降低此負外部性。但是由於課徵商品稅會對廠商的利潤產生重大影響，遊說行為的出現是可以預期的。在獨佔廠商的設定下，本文將在雙層級政府的體制中，討論允許遊說與否會如何影響稅收、商品稅率、政府目標效益以及消費者剩餘。當兩級政府的政策目標均同時考量社會福利以及本身的金錢收益時，在兩政府均課徵商品稅下，除了邊際生產成本及消費者考量環境成本程度很小時，兩級政府均可在有遊說下獲得較高的目標效益；而且，若兩政府是採取同時課稅的方式，有遊說下的稅收總是較大。不過，若此時是採用先中央後地方的順序稅率制定原則下，地方政府的稅收會因遊說而提高，但中央政府的稅收會因遊說而下降。另外，若消費者考量環境成本程度足夠小時，在有遊說下之消費者剩餘會大於在無遊說下的消費者剩餘。最後，允許遊說後，商品總稅率無論在何種課稅方式下，均較社會最適商品產量下的稅率低。

Governments can apply commodity taxes on goods with environmental burden to reduce the negative externality. Due to its significant impact on firm’s profitability, lobbying activities organized by the firm toward governments are expected on such taxation. In an economy with monopoly, we discuss how allowing lobbying affects tax revenues, tax rates, governments’ payoffs, and consumer surplus in a two-level government system. When both governments tax and target on social welfare and monetary proceeds simultaneously, their payoffs are maximized under lobbying if the product has a rather small marginal cost of production and consumers do not care about the environment much. With the same conditions, the central government’s tax revenue is lower and the local government’s is higher under lobbying if the central government taxes the product first. In addition, if two governments tax the product simultaneously, both governments’ tax revenues are higher under lobbying. Furthermore, if consumers do not care about the environment much, the consumer surplus is higher under lobbying. Finally, the total tax rate is always lower than the social optimal level if lobbying is permitted.

目錄
論文審定書……………………………………………………………….i
中文摘要…………………………………………………………………ii
英文摘要…………………………………………………...……………iii
目錄…………………………………………………………………...…iv
第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………........1
第一節 研究動機與目的………………………………………...1
第二節 研究方法與架構………………………………………...2
第二章 文獻回顧………………………………………………………...4
第三章 模型設定………………………………………………………...7
第四章 遊說與不同的課稅方式………………………….……….........11
第五章 不同課稅形式下的比較..……………………….………….....26
第六章 結論………………………………………………………….....39
參考文獻………………………………………………………………..41

中文部分：
林翠芳、翁仁甫、彭祐宜、詹昀姍(2020)。特種消費稅制度之國際比較與啟示。財稅研究，49(1)，94-134。
英文部分：
Antoniou, F., Michael M.S., Tsakiris, N. and Hatzipanayotou ,P., 2022, Tax competition in the presence of environmental spillovers, International Tax and Public Finance, 29, 600-626.

Esteller-Moré, A., Rizzo, L. and Galmarini, U., 2012, Vertical tax competition and consumption externalities in a federation with lobbying, Journal of Public Economics, 96, 295-305.

Esteller-Moré, A., Rizzo, L. and Galmarini, U., 2017, Fiscal equalization and lobbying, International Tax and Public Finance, 24, 221-247.

Galinato, G. I. and Batina R.G., 2017, The spillover effects of good governance in a tax competition framework with a negative environmental externality, Environmental Resource Economics, 67, 701–724.

Lai, Y. B., 2010, The political economy of capital market integration and tax competition, European Journal of Political Economy, 26, 475-487.

Santoni, M., 2017, Protective excise taxation, Journal of Industry Competition and Trade, 17, 421-445.

Winter, S., 2017, Symmetric tax competition and lobbying within federations, European Journal of Political Economy, 49, 134-145.