本文以臺北市文山區為背景來研究國小分發之擇校問題，主要探討增加學生之偏好列表長度所帶來的影響。由於現行機制讓學生的可選擇學校數量有所限制，我們將設計一種改良機制來放寬這個限制，使學生有更多的學校可以選擇。在現行機制中，學區依學生設籍地可分為一般學區及共同學區，學校依預估入學人數可分為一般學校及額滿學校。我們將固定額滿學校配額，調整一般學校配額來進行模擬，並比較由現行機制轉為實施改良機制後學生的效用變化。我們的研究結果顯示：在一般學校配額不夠充足時，效用受影響的學生較多，但改良機制的採用與否尚有疑慮；在一般學校配額充足時，採用改良機制將提高部分學生的效用。

　　This paper uses the Wenshan District of Taipei City as an example to study the school choice problem of elementary school admission and discusses the impact of increasing the length of the students' preference list. Since the current mechanism restricts the number of schools students can choose, we will design an improved mechanism to relax this restriction so that students have more schools to choose from. In the current mechanism, school districts can be divided into general school districts and common school districts according to the registration of the residency locations of students, and schools can be divided into general schools and full-capacity schools according to the estimated number of students enrolled. We will fix the full-capacity school quota, adjust the general school quota for simulations, and compare the change of students' utility after the current mechanism is changed to the improved mechanism. Our research results show that: when the general school quota is insufficient, more students' utilities are affected, but there are still doubts about the adoption of the improved mechanism; when the general school quota is sufficient, the adoption of the improved mechanism will increase the utility of some students.

論文審定書......................................................i
誌謝.................................................................ii
摘要................................................................iii
Abstract..........................................................iv
目錄.................................................................v
圖目錄............................................................vi
表目錄...........................................................vii
第一章　緒論.................................................1
第一節　研究動機.........................................1
第二節　研究方法與架構.............................3
第二章　文獻回顧.........................................4
第三章　模型.................................................8
第一節　模型設置.........................................8
第二節　Gale-Shapley演算法.....................10
第四章　現行機制與改良機制之比較.......11
第一節　現行機制.......................................11
第二節　改良機制.......................................11
第三節　範例...............................................11
第五章　模擬...............................................15
第一節　模擬參數設置...............................15
第二節　模擬結果.......................................19
第六章　結論...............................................24
參考文獻.......................................................25

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