本文旨在探討寡占市場下游製造商與上游航運商進行不同形式勾結的誘因，分析在數量競爭下維持卡特爾的條件。此外我們也將進一步比較競爭與不同勾結形式下產量、廠商利潤、社會福利、維持勾結條件等變量差異。本論文的研究結果顯示在數量競爭下，進行垂直勾結是最為困難的。從社會福利分析進行水平勾結能使整體社會的福利最大。

This study aims to examine the incentives for different forms of collusion between downstream manufacturers and upstream carriers in duopolistic markets and analyze the conditions for sustaining cartels under quantity competition. Additionally, we will further compare the variations in variables such as output, firm profits, social welfare, and conditions for sustaining collusion under competition and different forms of collusion. The research findings of this study demonstrate that vertical collusion is particularly challenging to be achieved under quantity competition. From the social welfare analysis perspective, the horizontal collusion maximizes the overall societal welfare.

論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目錄 iv
圖次 v
第一章 前言 1
第二章 實際案例 4
第三章 基本模型 6
3.1 無勾結下的市場均衡 7
3.2 水平勾結下的市場均衡 8
3.3 維持水平勾結的條件 9
第四章 航運商為獨占時的水平勾結( r >τ) 13
4.1 無勾結下的市場均衡 13
4.2 水平勾結下的市場均衡 14
4.3 維持水平勾結的條件 15
第五章 航運商為獨占時的垂直勾結( r>τ) 17
5.1 垂直勾結下的市場均衡 17
5.2 維持垂直勾結的條件 18
第六章 結論 24
參考文獻 25
附錄 26

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