本文討論台灣就職考試制度議題，以中華民國農會考試為例子，研究中華民國農會在現行存在的考試制度下運作之方法，發現在現行規則中具有改進的空間，因此藉由Gale & Shapley (1962)提出的婚姻模型為基礎，引進遞延接受演算法(deferred acceptance algorithm 簡稱:DA)來提出改進現行規則之方案，並在模擬中使用Gale & Sotomayor (1985)將多對一配對問題簡化成一對一配對問題的方法，最後透過模擬，我們得出當農會數量(quota)越多的情況下，參加考試之人會更偏好在本文中所提及的改善規則。

We discuss the issue of Taiwan's examination system by taking the National Farmers' Association, R.O.C. examination as an example. We study the existing examination system of the National Farmers' Association, R.O.C. and find that the current rules have room for improvement. We use Gale & Shapley (1962)'s marriage model and their deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) to improve the current rules. In addition, we use the method proposed by Gale & Sotomayor (1985) to reduce many-to-one matchings to one-to-one matchings in our simulations. Finally, through simulations, we conclude that when the National Farmers' Association, R.O.C.’s quotas are larger, the person taking the exam will prefer the improved mechanisms introduced in this paper.

論文審定書……………………………………………………………........i
摘要………………………………………………………….…...…….......ii
Abstract………………………………………..……………………..……iii
第 一 章 緒論………………………………………………….….….....1
第一節 研究動機…………………………………………………..1
第二節 研究方法與目的…………..………………………………2
第三節 研究架構…………………………………………………..2
第 二 章 文獻回顧……………………………………………………...3
第 三 章 農會考試規則與模型………………………………………...6
第一節 中華民國農會背景概述…………………………………..6
第二節 簡化規則與模型…………..………………………………7
第三節 性質介紹…………..……………………………………..13
第 四 章 模擬與探討………………………………………………….15
第 五 章 結論………………………………………………………….27
參考文獻…………………………………………………………...……..28
附錄一…………………………………………………………………29

1. Gale & Shapley(1962) “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage” The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 69, No.1, pp. 9-15.
2. Alvin E. Roth(1982) “The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives” Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol.7, No.4, pp. 617-628.
3. Dubins & Freedman (1981)“Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm” The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol.88, No.7,pp. 485-494.
4. David Gale & Matilda Sotomayor(1985) “Some Remarks On The Stable Matching Problem” Discrete Applied Mathematics,Vol.11, No.3, pp. 223-232.
5. Alvin E. Roth (1985) “The College Admissions Problem is not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem” Journal of Economic Theory,Vol.36, pp. 277-288.
6. Balinskiand & Sönmez (1999) “A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.84, pp.73-94.
7. Abdulkadiroğlu & Sönmez(2003) “School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach” The American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 729-747.
8. Alvin E. Roth(2008) “Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol.36, pp.537-569.
9. Ekmekci & Yenmez(2019) “Common enrollment in school choice” Theoretical Economics,Vol.14, pp.1237-1270.
10. McVitie & L.B. Wilson (1969) “Three Procedures for the Stable Marriage Problem” Communications of the ACM, Vol.14, pp.491–492.